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ABSTRACT
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved excellent per-
formance on several tasks and have been widely applied in
both academia and industry. However, DNNs are vulnera-
ble to adversarial machine learning attacks, in which noise is
added to the input to change the network output. We have de-
vised an image-processing-based method to detect adversar-
ial images based on our observation that adversarial noise is
reduced after applying these operations while the normal im-
ages almost remain unaffected. In addition to detection, this
method can be used to restore the adversarial images’ original
labels, which is crucial to restoring the normal functionalities
of DNN-based systems. Testing using an adversarial machine
learning database we created for generating several types of
attack using images from the ImageNet Large Scale Visual
Recognition Challenge database demonstrated the efficiency
of our proposed method for both detection and correction.
Index Terms— adversarial machine learning, detecting
adversarial image, correcting adversarial image, deep neural
network
1. INTRODUCTION
Although adversarial machine learning is not a new issue in
the machine learning community, as it was first discussed in
2004 [1], it has recently become a major concern due to the
advances made in deep learning that have made deep neural
networks (DNNs) vulnerable to adversarial attacks [2]. Be-
sides traditional logical attacks, in which adversarial noise is
added to image or audio files, attackers can now create phys-
ical adversarial examples [3, 4, 5, 6]. When autonomous sys-
tems have become mainstream in both the research commu-
nity and industry, physical adversarial attacks may threaten
their safety and reliability. Besides white-box attacks, in
which attackers have full knowledge of the inner configura-
tion of the target models, attackers will also be able to per-
form black-box attacks, which are more likely since attackers
need only acquire only the models’ outputs [7].
Several countermeasures have been proposed for detect-
ing adversarial examples such as statistical testing [8], di-
rectly detecting pixels in input images [9], detecting using
features from intermediate layers of the targeted DNN [10],
applying statistical analysis to the outputs of the intermediate
layers [11], and using adaptive noise reduction [12]. Xu et al.
used feature squeezing to reduce the search space available to
an adversary which was useful for detection [13]. Besides de-
tection, there have been several attempts to harness the DNN
models in training by using distillation [14], obfuscating gra-
dients [15], or applying the reverse cross-entropy loss func-
tion [16]. Input preprocessing is another direction to defense
against adversarial example attacks [17, 18], however, their
performances are still limited. Several adversarial databases
have been independently created for use in evaluating the pro-
posed methods, but detailed guidelines for creating them have
not been reported.
In this paper, first, we present the procedure we used for
creating an adversarial database using images from the Ima-
geNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC)
2012 validation set [19]. We used the FoolBox library [20]
to create adversarial images for two types of attack: tar-
geted attacks, which force the outputs to become target la-
bels, and non-targeted attacks, which force the top-5 outputs
to not include certain labels [7] (discussed in section 2). Sec-
ond, we discuss the measured effects of some image pro-
cessing operations on both normal and adversarial images
given the hypothesis that adversarial noise is reduced, result-
ing in the classification labels of the adversarial images being
changed while the normal images almost remain unaffected
(section 3.1). This measurement was motivated by the work
of Xu et al. [13], Guo et al. [17], and Liang et al. [12]. We also
discuss the use of these operations to detect adversarial im-
ages on the basis of statistics (section 3.2) and to correct their
labels as classified by the targeted object recognition DNNs
(section 3.3).
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Fig. 1. Overview of data generation procedure using a CNN. The same procedure was used with VGG-16, VGG-19, ResNet-
18, and ResNet-50 networks in order to create a complete normal dataset (for normal images) and an adversarial dataset (for
adversarial images).
2. CREATING ADVERSARIAL DATABASE
2.1. Overview
We used images from the ILSVRC 2012 validation set [19]
(which has labeled ground truths) to generate the adversarial
images used in our experiments. For the object recognition
CNNs, we used pre-trained VGG-16 and -19 networks (as
proposed by the Visual Geometry Group) [21] and pre-trained
ResNet-18 and -50 networks (as proposed by Microsoft Re-
search) [22], implemented using the PyTorch framework [23].
We used the Pillow library1 for image processing and the
FoolBox library (version 1.8.0) [20] for adversarial image
generation. Twelve commonly used methods (Table 1) were
used to perform targeted and non-targeted adversarial attacks.
An overview of the procedure we used is shown in Fig. 1.
We used each CNN to classify 5 million images from the
ILSVRC 2012 validation set. We then randomly selected
1000 images per CNN that were correctly classified (the
ground-truth labels were among the predicted top-5 results).
Only 1000 image per CNN were selected due to the time re-
quired to create adversarial images from them. The selected
images were added to the normal dataset. We then performed
the 12 adversarial attacks listed in Table 1 on the selected im-
ages and selected misclassified ones (those for which the pre-
dicted top-5 results did not contain the previously predicted
labels). The Pillow library was used to save them as JPEG
files with a quality factor of 100 to ensure that the attack was
close to a real-world scenario since adversarial noise can be
lost when saving adversarial images to a file. We then loaded
the saved images and used the same CNN to classify them
again to ensure that they were still misclassified. The mis-
classified adversarial images were then added to the adver-
sarial dataset. This procedure was also used with VGG-16,
VGG-19, ResNet-18, and ResNet-50 networks.
1https://pillow.readthedocs.io/en/stable
2.2. Creating Adversarial Images and Database
For targeted attacks, we used the limited-memory Broyden-
Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (L-BFGS) method proposed by
Szegedy et al. [2], the basic iterative method (BIM), which
uses L-infinity, the projected gradient descent (PGD) method
described by Kurakin et al. [3], and the L1- and L2- versions
of BIM (L1-iter and L2-iter) implemented in FoolBox [20].
Since the ILSVRC 2012 validation set has 1000 labels, the
target label index for each adversarial image was its 100-
step-right-shifted top-1 predicted label index (calculated us-
ing the target CNN). Modular operation was used to ensure
the shifted label index was in the range [0, 1000). The attack
criteria for the target class probability was 99%.
For non-targeted attacks, we used the basic gradient at-
tack method implemented in FoolBox [20], the fast gradient
signed method (FGSM) proposed by Goodfellow et al. [24],
the Deep Fool method proposed by Moosavi-Dezfooli et
al. [25], the Newton method proposed by Jang et al. [26], the
ADef method proposed by Alaifari et al. [27], the Saliency
Map method proposed by Papernot et al. [28], and the attack
method proposed by Carlini and Wagner [29]. Since these
methods are non-targeted attacks, the attack criterion was to
change the predicted top-5 labels so that they were different
from the original predicted top-1 labels.
As shown by the results in Table 1, the VGG networks
were generally more vulnerable to targeted attacks than the
ResNet networks, resulting in a larger numbers of misclas-
sified images. The modified BIM attack using the L2 dis-
tance (L2-iter) was the most effective attack overall. The non-
targeted attacks were more difficult to carry out since they
needed to change the top-5 labels so that they did not include
the current top-1 labels. Among them, Deep Fool was the
most successful while the ADef attack was the least success-
ful overall, producing only one or four adversarial images for
each network. The Saliency Map attack also had limited suc-
cess, with around 100 adversarial images for each network.
Table 1. Number of successful adversarial images created
using FoolBox library [20] on VGG-16, VGG-19, ResNet-18,
and ResNet-50 networks.
Method VGG-16 VGG-19 ResNet-18 ResNet-50
Targeted attacks:
L-BFGS [2] 618 623 348 229
BIM [3] 693 711 531 431
PGD [3] 651 678 484 348
L1-iter [20] 661 591 680 513
L2-iter [20] 820 746 722 583
Non-targeted attacks:
Gradient [20] 654 548 590 517
FGSM [24] 509 450 451 379
Deep Fool [25] 707 671 658 604
Newton [26] 571 505 558 425
ADef [27] 1 4 1 1
Saliency Map [28] 102 86 114 71
Carlini-Wagner [29] 427 361 401 299
We mixed together the 1000 normal images from each
classifier and the created adversarial images and divided them
into training (train), development (dev), and evaluation (eval)
sets at an approximate ratio of 7.0:1.5:1.5, as detailed in Ta-
ble 2. The train set was used for training, the dev set was used
to select the model, and the eval set was used to test the classi-
fiers. We ensured that the normal images and their adversarial
versions in the three sets did not overlap so that the classifier
would not remember the training images. We did not focus
on detecting adversarial images created by unseen adversarial
attacks, so the images from each attack had equal probabili-
ties of appearing in the three sets. The number of adversarial
images was more than five times that of normal images.
Table 2. Details of normal and adversarial image datasets,
which were divided into training, development, and evalua-
tion sets.
Dataset Normal Adversarial Total Ratio
Train 2,800 16,110 18,910 1:5.75
Dev 600 3,092 3,692 1:5.15
Eval 600 3,124 3,724 1:5.21
3. EFFECTS OF IMAGE PROCESSING
OPERATIONS ON NORMAL AND ADVERSARIAL
IMAGES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS
In section 3.1, we describe the effects of applying four im-
age processing operations to images (normal and adversar-
ial) on the top-5 classification results for VGG-16, VGG-19,
ResNet-18, and ResNet-50 networks. Differences in behavior
between normal and adversarial images were identified, and
these differences could be useful for detecting (section 3.2)
and correcting adversarial images (section 3.3).
3.1. Effects of Image Processing Operations on Normal
and Adversarial Images
We extended the ideas of Xu et al. [13], Guo et al. [17], and
Liang et al. [12] by measuring the change in the top-5 labels
after applying four image processing operations with various
parameters (listed below) to normal and adversarial images.
• JPEG compression with quality ∈ {100, 95, 90, 85, 80,
75, 70, 65, 60, 55, 50, 45, 40, 35, 30, 25}.
• Gaussian blur with kernel size ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}.
• Clockwise image rotation with angle ∈ {1°, 2°, 3°, 4°,
5°, 6°, 7°, 8°} and without reversing back.
• Image scaling with scale ∈ {0.75, 0.8, 0.85, 0.9, 0.95,
1.05, 1.1, 1.15, 1.2, 1.25} and without reversing back.
The image operations were done using Pillow version
6.1.0. Some of the results for ResNet-18 are shown in Table 3.
Similar behaviors were also observed for VGG-16, VGG-
19, and ResNet-50. The JPEG compression with quality 100
changed the top-5 labels for both the normal and adversarial
images, however its effect on adversarial images was clearer.
Reducing image quality by increasing the compression ratio
greatly reduced the number of misclassified adversarial im-
ages and slightly increased that of misclassified normal im-
ages. A large increase in the compression ratio increased the
misclassification rate for normal images. The results for scal-
ing, Gaussian blur, and rotation were similar to those for com-
pression. One result in particular should be noted: the number
of misclassified normal images after applying 3× 3 Gaussian
blur kernel was higher than after applying the other opera-
tions, which is not good for our purposes.
3.2. Detecting Adversarial Images using Statistical Fea-
tures
As mentioned above, the differences in behavior between nor-
mal and adversarial images for the top-5 labels when the four
image processing operations are applied may be useful for
detecting adversarial images. We thus propose using two fea-
tures for detecting adversarial images: a counting feature and
a differences feature. First, we define three variables.
• L = (a, b, c, d, e): top-5 label for image I (normal
or adversarial) predicted using a CNN before applying
image processing operation i (e.g., JPEG compression
with a quality of 80 or 5°clockwise rotation).
• Li = (ai, bi, ci, di, ei): top-5 label for an image after
applying image processing operation i.
• n: total number of image processing operations (38 in
our experiments).
Table 3. Number of top-5 misclassified images for ResNet-18 network from both normal and adversarial datasets before and
after applying image processing operations.
Attack Original JPEG Compression Scaling Gaussian Rotation100 80 60 40 20 0.75 0.85 0.95 1.05 1.15 1.25 3 × 3 2° 5°
Normal images 0 6 29 50 59 108 93 44 34 26 52 35 329 54 75
Targeted attack:
L-BFGS [2] 348 341 41 50 58 67 88 58 44 59 68 42 63 61 92
BIM [3] 531 529 52 54 69 88 103 66 55 65 84 47 87 72 101
PGD [3] 484 479 45 50 61 82 102 60 53 61 77 42 77 65 95
L1-iter [20] 680 676 60 62 61 81 100 71 65 80 92 60 93 91 115
L2-iter [20] 722 720 66 59 72 88 107 72 69 88 99 60 100 99 123
Non-targeted attack:
Gradient [20] 590 584 107 76 66 95 93 70 75 115 122 86 108 105 155
FGSM [24] 451 449 109 87 76 101 99 67 79 125 124 93 95 110 158
Deep Fool [25] 658 645 83 55 51 72 60 51 59 74 72 46 59 80 50
Newton [26] 558 552 118 61 60 74 62 61 64 90 82 48 82 105 68
ADef [27] 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Saliency Map [28] 114 109 42 41 40 54 59 40 28 36 38 27 33 43 44
Carlini-Wagner [29] 401 391 59 50 48 75 68 43 42 59 59 45 38 67 49
Table 4. Accuracy (in %) of each classifier using counting feature (count) and difference feature (diff.) on eval set.
Classifier JPEG Scaling Gaussian Blur Rotation JPEG + Scaling AllCount Diff. Count Diff. Count Diff. Count Diff. Count Diff. Count Diff.
SVM (SVC) [30] 90.98 91.92 92.56 92.32 87.35 87.35 89.90 89.39 92.86 94.04 93.39 94.20
Random forest [31] 90.57 89.82 91.08 91.27 86.87 86.04 88.24 88.59 92.16 91.94 92.35 92.35
LDA [32] 89.98 90.36 91.97 91.62 85.77 87.35 89.15 89.29 92.86 92.67 92.21 92.86
MLP [33] 91.25 90.41 92.32 92.35 86.95 87.38 89.66 89.02 93.56 92.19 93.37 92.29
3.2.1. Counting feature
Let us call C(a) the number of occurrences of label a ∈ L =
(a, b, c, d, e) at the first position in an ordered top-5 label set
{Li|i = 1..n} and 1(.) the counting function. C(a) is defined
as
C(a) =
n∑
i=1
1(ai = a). (1)
The same equation is used for b, c, d, and e at the second,
third, four, and fifth positions, respectively. Therefore, the
features of each image are {C(a), C(b), C(c), C(d), C(e)}.
3.2.2. Differences feature
Let us call ∆(a, ai) the binary differential function used to
measure the difference between two labels, a and ai:
∆(a, ai) =
{
1, if ai 6= a
0, if ai = a.
(2)
The differences feature derived from input image I can be
expressed as the set
{(∆(a, ai),∆(b, bi),∆(c, ci),∆(d, di),∆(e, ei))|i = 1..n}.
3.2.3. Detecting adversarial images using image-processing-
based features
Using the two features introduced above, we evaluated the
performance of detectors using one of the four classifiers: the
C-support vector classification (SVC) version of the support
vector machine (SVM) classifier [30], the random forest clas-
sifier [31] with 100 estimators and a maximum depth of 2,
the linear discriminant analysis (LDA) classifier [32], and the
multiple layer perception (MLP) classifier [33]. All of them
were implemented in the scikit-learn library version 0.21.32.
As shown in Table 4, the differences feature produced
slightly higher accuracies than the counting feature (which
was smaller than the differences feature). Among the individ-
ual image processing operations, the scaling one achieved the
highest accuracy for all detectors. Also as shown in the table,
the combination of JPEG compression and scaling and the
combination of all operations resulted in higher accuracy than
using any of them separately. However, these combinations
also increased the feature size and more classification oper-
ations were required of the CNNs (VGG-Nets or ResNets)
to produce those features. For the counting feature, using
the MLP-based detector on the features from JPEG compres-
sion and the scaling operation resulted in the highest accuracy
(93.56%) while for the differences feature, using the SVM-
2https://scikit-learn.org/stable
based detector on all features from all image processing oper-
ations resulted in the highest accuracy (94.20%).
3.3. Correcting Adversarial Images
Given that the image processing operations substantially re-
duced the number of misclassified adversarial images, they
could also be useful in restoring the original labels of the im-
ages in addition to classifying them. Those operations helped
mitigate the adversarial noise while only slightly affecting the
normal images. Since there are several kinds of adversarial
attacks, we focused on correcting noise-based adversarial im-
ages. The correction task is usually performed after adver-
sarial image detection. In this section, we introduce our pro-
posed correction method and the experiment results.
3.3.1. Proposed correction method
Let us call S = {Li|i = 1..n} the set of top-5 labels acquired
by applying n image processing operations to image I . We
calculated the frequencies of every label in S and identified
the five labels with the highest frequencies. These labels were
the corrected top-5 ones.
3.3.2. Evaluation
Since there were false positive inputs, i.e., normal images
misclassified as adversarial images, we tested our correction
method on both normal and adversarial images. We used our
entire database for testing. For the image processing opera-
tions, we used JPEG compression, scaling, and their combi-
nation. As shown in Table 5, JPEG compression had better
performance than scaling operation for the adversarial im-
ages, and their combination produced the best performance.
Only 1.88% of the normal images was misclassified after
“correction” while 89.91% of the adversarial images were
corrected. If we performed this correction after detection of
adversarial images, 98.12% of the false positive inputs (nor-
mal images misclassified as adversarial ones) would also be
corrected.
Table 5. Percentage of corrected top-5 classifications after
applying proposed correction method to both normal and ad-
versarial images.
Operation(s) Normal Images Adversarial Images
JPEG compression 96.30 88.63
Scaling 97.82 85.69
Both 98.12 89.91
4. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
The statistical-based detector using image processing oper-
ations demonstrated its ability to detect adversarial images
with high accuracy. The corresponding correction method to
restore the original labels of adversarial images can be used
together with the proposed detectors to improve the perfor-
mance of DNNs under adversarial attack. Future work will
address more adversarial attacks with multiple noise strengths
on larger and more diverse databases along with reducing the
number of image processing operations in order to reduce
computational expense.
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grants
JP16H06302, JP17H04687, JP18H04120, JP18H04112,
JP18KT0051, JP19K22846, and by JST CREST Grant JP-
MJCR18A6, Japan.
References
[1] Nilesh Dalvi, Pedro Domingos, Sumit Sanghai, Deepak
Verma, et al., “Adversarial classification,” in PSIGKDD.
ACM, 2004, pp. 99–108.
[2] Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever,
Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian Goodfellow, and Rob
Fergus, “Intriguing properties of neural networks,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199, 2013.
[3] Alexey Kurakin, Ian Goodfellow, and Samy Bengio,
“Adversarial examples in the physical world,” in ILCR-
W, 2017.
[4] Kevin Eykholt, Ivan Evtimov, Earlence Fernandes,
Bo Li, Amir Rahmati, Florian Tramer, Atul Prakash, Ta-
dayoshi Kohno, and Dawn Song, “Physical adversarial
examples for object detectors,” in WOOT, 2018.
[5] Adith Boloor, Xin He, Christopher Gill, Yevgeniy
Vorobeychik, and Xuan Zhang, “Simple physical adver-
sarial examples against end-to-end autonomous driving
models,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.05157, 2019.
[6] Lea Scho¨nherr, Katharina Kohls, Steffen Zeiler,
Thorsten Holz, and Dorothea Kolossa, “Adversarial at-
tacks against automatic speech recognition systems via
psychoacoustic hiding,” in NDSS, 2019.
[7] Han Xu, Yao Ma, Haochen Liu, Debayan Deb, Hui Liu,
Jiliang Tang, and Anil Jain, “Adversarial attacks and
defenses in images, graphs and text: A review,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1909.08072, 2019.
[8] Kathrin Grosse, Praveen Manoharan, Nicolas Papernot,
Michael Backes, and Patrick McDaniel, “On the (statis-
tical) detection of adversarial examples,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1702.06280, 2017.
[9] Zhitao Gong, Wenlu Wang, and Wei-Shinn Ku, “Ad-
versarial and clean data are not twins,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1704.04960, 2017.
[10] Jan Hendrik Metzen, Tim Genewein, Volker Fischer,
and Bastian Bischoff, “On detecting adversarial pertur-
bations,” in ICLR, 2017.
[11] Xin Li and Fuxin Li, “Adversarial examples detection
in deep networks with convolutional filter statistics,” in
CVPR, 2017, pp. 5764–5772.
[12] Bin Liang, Hongcheng Li, Miaoqiang Su, Xirong Li,
Wenchang Shi, and XiaoFeng Wang, “Detecting ad-
versarial image examples in deep neural networks with
adaptive noise reduction,” IEEE Transactions on De-
pendable and Secure Computing, 2018.
[13] Weilin Xu, David Evans, and Yanjun Qi, “Feature
squeezing: Detecting adversarial examples in deep neu-
ral networks,” in NDSS, 2018.
[14] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Xi Wu, Somesh
Jha, and Ananthram Swami, “Distillation as a defense to
adversarial perturbations against deep neural networks,”
in SP. IEEE, 2016, pp. 582–597.
[15] Anish Athalye, Nicholas Carlini, and David Wagner,
“Obfuscated gradients give a false sense of security:
Circumventing defenses to adversarial examples,” in
ICLR, 2018, pp. 274–283.
[16] Tianyu Pang, Chao Du, Yinpeng Dong, and Jun Zhu,
“Towards robust detection of adversarial examples,” in
NeurIPS, 2018, pp. 4579–4589.
[17] Chuan Guo, Mayank Rana, Moustapha Cisse, and Lau-
rens Van Der Maaten, “Countering adversarial images
using input transformations,” in ICLR, 2018.
[18] Aaditya Prakash, Nick Moran, Solomon Garber, An-
tonella DiLillo, and James Storer, “Protecting jpeg im-
ages against adversarial attacks,” in Data Compression
Conference. IEEE, 2018, pp. 137–146.
[19] Olga Russakovsky, Jia Deng, Hao Su, Jonathan Krause,
Sanjeev Satheesh, Sean Ma, Zhiheng Huang, Andrej
Karpathy, Aditya Khosla, Michael Bernstein, Alexan-
der C. Berg, and Li Fei-Fei, “ImageNet Large Scale
Visual Recognition Challenge,” IJCV, vol. 115, no. 3,
pp. 211–252, 2015.
[20] Jonas Rauber, Wieland Brendel, and Matthias Bethge,
“Foolbox: A python toolbox to benchmark the ro-
bustness of machine learning models,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1707.04131, 2017.
[21] Karen Simonyan and Andrew Zisserman, “Very deep
convolutional networks for large-scale image recogni-
tion,” in CLR, 2015.
[22] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian
Sun, “Deep residual learning for image recognition,” in
CVPR, 2016, pp. 770–778.
[23] Adam Paszke, Sam Gross, Soumith Chintala, Gregory
Chanan, Edward Yang, Zachary DeVito, Zeming Lin,
Alban Desmaison, Luca Antiga, and Adam Lerer, “Au-
tomatic differentiation in pytorch,” in NIPS-W, 2017.
[24] Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian
Szegedy, “Explaining and harnessing adversarial exam-
ples,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572, 2014.
[25] Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi,
and Pascal Frossard, “Deepfool: a simple and accurate
method to fool deep neural networks,” in CVPR, 2016,
pp. 2574–2582.
[26] Uyeong Jang, Xi Wu, and Somesh Jha, “Objective met-
rics and gradient descent algorithms for adversarial ex-
amples in machine learning,” in ACSAC. ACM, 2017,
pp. 262–277.
[27] Rima Alaifari, Giovanni S Alberti, and Tandri Gauks-
son, “ADef: an iterative algorithm to construct adver-
sarial deformations,” in ILCR, 2019.
[28] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Somesh Jha, Matt
Fredrikson, Z Berkay Celik, and Ananthram Swami,
“The limitations of deep learning in adversarial set-
tings,” in EuroS&P. IEEE, 2016, pp. 372–387.
[29] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner, “Towards evalu-
ating the robustness of neural networks,” in SP. IEEE,
2017, pp. 39–57.
[30] Corinna Cortes and Vladimir Vapnik, “Support-vector
networks,” Machine learning, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 273–
297, 1995.
[31] Tin Kam Ho, “Random decision forests,” in ICDAR.
IEEE, 1995, vol. 1, pp. 278–282.
[32] Richard O Duda, Peter E Hart, David G Stork, et al.,
Pattern classification, vol. 2, Wiley New York, 1973.
[33] Dennis W Ruck, Steven K Rogers, Matthew Kabrisky,
Mark E Oxley, and Bruce W Suter, “The multilayer per-
ceptron as an approximation to a bayes optimal discrim-
inant function,” IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks,
vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 296–298, 1990.
